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Alex Pruden
CEO Project 11 @qdayclock, Chairman @aleoHQ, Contributor @zeroknowledgefm, Founder @z_prize; Fmr @a16zcrypto, @coinbase, @standfordGSB, fmr green hat U.S. Army
Awareness is more than half the battle. BTC addresses (P2SH, P2PKH, or P2WPKH) are secure from a quantum attack if not re-used
13 tuntia sitten
💥 1,083 BTC transferred to a quantum-vulnerable address 😬.
Reason: funds transferred to a re-used P2WPKH address.
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Sadly, in a world where every engagement-farmer has access to an LLM, misinformed slop like this will proliferate.
We don't need to be doomsdayers. But I think acknowledging the consensus of @NIST, @GoogleQuantumAI, @Microsoft, countless physicists/cryptographers that runs counter to this
11.8. klo 23.00
Microsoft built a 1-million-qubit quantum computer.
Bitcoin holders are panicking—this could crack crypto encryption.
But your seed phrase has 340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 combinations.
Here's why quantum still can't touch it:
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When I was the CEO over @AleoHQ during the days of Operation Chokepoint 2.0, we had managed to get our money out of SVB after it collapsed and we're looking to diversify into other banks.
We had an initial call with JPMC and they expressed interest. But when they realized we were a crypto startup on the first call, the MD proceeded to berate my CFO (who had just come from Citadel) and me (a former a16z investor and US Army Green Beret) about how we were enabling crime, trashing our personal reputations, and pursuing unpatriotic careers just to get rich (!)
Needless to say they didn't open an account for us. But after that call I told them I wanted the reason in writing.
The email they sent back was some soupy-oatmeal version of AML, reputation risk blah blah blah.
We did ultimately find a bank that would bank us, and @AleoHQ successfully launched last year.
But that experience opened my eyes to how arbitrary the banking/finance industry can be.
So when I hear those losers cry about stablecoins threatening their deposits I'm like "let em cook".
13.8. klo 22.52
excellent, detailed history of political debanking in recent years from one of the OG scholars of bank politicization. plus suggestions on how to resolve debanking. amazing article
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Open-source software has been the lifeblood of technology innovation since the dawn of the Internet, and demonstrates that the collective value of an open, transparent, cooperative ecosystem far outweighs the value of building a walled garden.
12.8. klo 19.29
"I support it only if it's open source" should be a more common viewpoint
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Alex Pruden kirjasi uudelleen
Be sure to check out @Joseph_Kearney's final PhD thesis publication "Quantum Advantage on Blockchain Technologies" from the University of Kent @UniKent
Three interesting points from the paper:
1. Industry-wide quantum vulnerability
The research is one of the first to systematically assess how quantum computers could impact multiple major public blockchains, not just Bitcoin. It finds that nearly all leading chains share a serious weakness: their reliance on ECDSA and similar signature schemes makes them uniformly vulnerable to Shor’s algorithm, enabling potential key theft and transaction forgeries once large-scale quantum machines become available.
2. Quantum-assisted Proof-of-Work attacks
The work challenges prior assumptions that Proof-of-Work was safe from near-term quantum threats. It shows that Grover’s algorithm could give a quadratic mining advantage, enough that within the next two decades a single quantum-equipped miner could realistically mount a 51% attack on Bitcoin (and thus any PoW network) by outpacing honest miners.
3. Massive potential energy savings
Beyond threats, the thesis introduces “quantum cryptocurrency miners,” which could deliver up to 99.999% reductions in energy use for PoW mining compared to classical ASICs. This saving—comparable to the annual energy consumption of Sweden—comes from the reversibility and efficiency of quantum computation, suggesting a possible cooperative role for quantum devices in making blockchains more sustainable.
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Great thread by @ConorDeegan4 reviewing approaches for post-quantum migrations without a change of address (also the subject of a recent paper on EdDSA by @kostascrypto et al).
TLDR, canonical seed-to-key derivation should be treated as a first-class primitive vs an afterthought
12.8. klo 22.49
I've been looking into more post-quantum upgrade mechanisms, especially ones which do not require a change of address.
EdDSA chains that follow RFC-8032 (Ed25519 style) have a built-in advantage. Your signing key isn’t a raw random scalar, it’s deterministically derived from a short seed by hashing. That means you can prove you know the seed (in a post-quantum-sound ZK proof) and
bind a new post-quantum key to the same address. No fund moves and no new curve data on-chain. Even dormant accounts can be upgraded if the seed exists. This covers chains like Sui, Solana, NEAR, Stellar, Aptos.
Bitcoin/Ethereum don’t have that invariant by default because many ECDSA keys came from "just pick a random scalar". But there is a possible path for big cohorts that use BIP-39 → BIP-32 with well defined paths. You can prove that exact derivation and bind a post-quantum key without moving funds. But, it’s wallet-specific and may be complex:
- BIP-39’s PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 (2048 rounds) is costly in ZK
- BIP-32 adds HMAC-SHA512 and secp256k1 math inside the circuit
Still, for common paths (e.g., Ethereum m/44’/60’/0’/0/x), it may be feasible.
Generally there are two deployment patterns:
1. One-time proof + mapping: publish a proof once and record address → post-quantum key. From then on, you sign post-quantum for that address.
2. Per-transaction proof: each transaction carries a single proof that ties the seed to the address and authorizes the message. Stateless, but every verifier must check the proof. This may rule out a lot of chains given the performance overhead of verifying the proof per tx.
Why this works: Shor’s algorithm breaks discrete logs (so public-key systems like ECDSA/EdDSA fail once the public key is exposed). Grover’s algorithm only gives a quadratic speedup for hash preimages. So if your private key is derived from a seed via a strong hash (e.g.,
SHA-512), the seed remains hidden even if a future machine recovers today’s key. That’s why the "seed-first" design in EdDSA helps.
Also, you don’t need a hard fork to start. Before Q-Day you can also bind identities without ZK by cross-signing the legacy address and the post-quantum key in both directions and anchoring it to time. That’s what we built with yellowpages.
In the post I break down the mechanics, what you can save today on EdDSA chains, what you can realistically save on ECDSA, the trade-offs of one-time vs per-tx proofs, and the limits you should care about (seed handling, replay protection, proof cost). Full write-up below.
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